Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) as defined in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are very important for the safety of offshore oil & natural gas installations. SIS typically include the Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) that ensures that process systems return to a safe state in case of undesirable events. Partly as a consequence of the evolving "Integrated Operations" concept, a need is emerging for remote access to such systems from vendors external to the operating company. This access will pass through a number of IP-based networks used for other purposes, including the open Internet. This raises a number of security issues, ultimately threatening the safety integrity of SIS.
Introduction
The concept of Integrated Operations (IO) is emerging as the preferred way of working in the oil and gas industry. Real-time cooperation between on-and offshore staff is required in order to optimize production, and new technologies and new work processes enable this.
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software and Internet connections are among the new technologies introduced, where "new" means that they have not been widely used in the context of process control before. The application area is remote operation, which enables onshore staff to log on to, and perform operations on, process control systems (PCS) and Safety and Automation Systems (SAS) offshore. This opens for a whole new set of threats related to information security that need to be considered.
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are crucial subsystems offshore. According to the IEC 61508/61611 series of standards [1] [2] and the PDS method [3], they are of paramount importance for the safety of an offshore installation. SIS typically include the Emergency Shutdown System (ESD), which often is the ultimate guarantor for fail-safe properties at such installations.
The use of new technologies must be trusted to not have any negative impact on SIS; i.e. impact that could raise significant doubt on its claimed Safety Integrity Level (SIL) [1] . This means that the communication channels used during remote operations must be technically secure, such that they can not be tampered with, misused or in other ways used to compromise SIS.
Information security is usually defined by the three terms confidentiality, integrity and availability [4] . In this paper the scope is limited to integrity concerns for SIS, which means that the objective of the "good practice for remote access" is to prevent unauthorized changes to SIS.
Industrial safety and information security issues are two related -but still rather different -fields of theory and practice [5] . In some application areas it is useful to seek to combine the two, and process control is an example of such an area. Combination will not be unproblematic, and some problems are already manifest in the mixed vocabulary that needs to be employed when we are addressing safety and security, respectively. Practitioners within both fields are concerned about this challenge. As further discussed in [6], combining these two approaches into a coherent whole is not achieved solely through a technical report, but a modest hope is that this paper may contribute to such a development.
In this paper, a network topology for secure remote access to SIS is presented. The solution includes contractor's network, operator's office network and process control network, and security mechanisms. Also, a method is described that can be used to assess whether a given network solution for remote access to SIS is acceptable. The paper is based on results from the Secure Safety (SeSa) project, funded by the Norwegian Research Council and PDS Forum.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 refers to related work, and our research method is briefly described in section 3. The good practice network topology is presented in section 4 and section 5. The method for assessing the impact on SIL is described in section 6. We give our conclusion in section 7 and suggest further work in section 8.
Related Work
The background and approach for the SeSa project was documented in [7] . Line et al.
[5] discuss general challenges in considering both safety and security in a given situation. Schoitsch [8] and Kosmowski et al. [9] explore relationships between traditional "security" assurance and "safety assurance" as exemplified by SIL.
The UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (formerly NISCC) has published guidelines on security of SCADA systems in general [10] , and on firewall deployment in such networks in particular [11] . The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has also released a preliminary guide to SCADA security [6] . Naedele [12] presents insights on IEC standardization efforts in industrial IT security, although it does not appear that the IEC today is any closer to a finalized standard.
